THE ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF ISLAM

NEW EDITION

PREPARED BY A NUMBER OF
LEADING ORIENTALISTS

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UNDER THE PATRONAGE OF
THE INTERNATIONAL UNION OF ACADEMIES

VOLUME VII

MIF — NAZ

LEIDEN — NEW YORK
E.J. BRILL
1993

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MÖNGKE, fourth Great Khān of the Mongol Empire. He was the son of Čingiz Khān's youngest son Toluy, the eldest of four by Toluy's chief wife Sorḳoḳtani Beki (the other being Ḳubilay [*q.v.*], Hülegü [*q.v.*] and Arigh-böke). He was born on 10 January 1209, according to the Chinese dynastic history of the Mongols, the *Yüan-shih* (W. Abramowski, *Die Chinesisichen Annalen des Möngke: Übersetzung des 3. Kapitels des YUAN-SHIH*, in *Zentralasiatische Studien*, xiii [1979], 7-71, at p. 16). His principal significance in the history of the Muslim world lies in the fact that it was at his behest that Hülegü mounted the expedition that resulted in the establishment of the Īlkhānate.

His fortunes were linked with those of Batu [*q.v.*], under whose command he served in at least the early stages of the great invasion of Russia and eastern Europe in 1237-42. On the death of the Great Khān Ögedey in 1241, a long interregnum followed. Ögedey's son Güyük only gained recognition as his successor in 1246; he and Batu had been enemies since the Russian campaign. Open conflict between them was averted only by Güyük's sudden death in 1248. A further interregnum lasted until 1251, when it was brought to an end by a coup d'état on the part of Batu and Möngke. In this the senior (Djočid) and junior (Toluyid) branches of the Čingizid house prevailed over the other two branches, the Čaghatayids and the Ögedeyids, many of whom were killed in the aftermath of Möngke's "election" and enthronement, which occurred on 1 July 1251. Batu himself had declined election, preferring to remain in his own lands of the Golden Horde; but the price of his support was autonomy in those lands. The Mongol Empire became a Batu-Möngke condominium, though see, for a different view, T.A. Allsen, *Mongol imperialism: the policies of the Grand Qan Möngke in China, Russia, and the Islamic lands*, Berkeley, etc. 1987, 54-63.

After ascending the throne, Möngke despatched major military forces in two directions. His brother Ḳubilay was sent to begin the subjugation of the Sung Empire in South China, while Hülegü was commissioned to march west against the Ismāʿīlīs of Persia and the ʿAbbāsid caliphate. Each of the expeditions, according to the Persian historian Djuwaynī, was granted two out of every ten soldiers available in the empire (Djuwaynī, iii, 90; Djuwaynī-Boyle, ii, 607). Both of these campaigns were still under way when Möngke died in China, according to the *Yüan-shih* in August 1259 (Abramowski, 33). His death precipitated a civil war over the succession to the Great Khānate between Ḳubilay and Arigh-böke, in which the former was victorious in 1264. It was possibly during Möngke's reign that the Islamic lands under Mongol control first had imposed on them the new "poll-tax" variety of *ḳūbčūr* [*q.v.*], though this may have begun earlier (Allsen, *op. cit.*, 147-9).

Möngke, though apparently remaining personally attached to his ancestral Shamanism, was notable for his interest in and tolerance of a wide range of religions. The Franciscan missionary William of Rubruck travelled to Mongolia in 1253-5 and visited Möngke's court at Ḳaraḳorum, at which he was a participant in a religious debate between Christians, Muslims and Buddhists. He also gives an account of the dramatic events of 1251 which is strikingly similar to Djuwaynī's and which like his own one doubtless reflects the version propagated by the victorious side in the dynastic conflict.

Bibliography: Primary sources: Chinese: the *Yüan-shih*, tr. W. Abramowski (cited in the article). Persian: Djuwaynī: Djūzdjānī, *Ṭabaḳāt-i Nāṣirī*, ed. ʿA.Ḥ. Ḥabībī, 2 vols., ²Kabul 1964-5, tr. H.G. Raverty, 2 vols., London 1881; Rashīd al-Dīn, *Djami el-Tévarikh*, ii, ed. E. Blochet, Leiden and London 1911, tr. J.A. Boyle, *The Successors of Genghis Khan*, New York and London 1971. European: William of Rubruck, *Itinerium*, ed. A. van den Wyngaert in *Sinica Franciscana*, i, Quaracchi-Florence 1929, tr. P. Jackson, *The Journey of William of Rubruck 1253-5*, Hakluyt Society, Cambridge 1990. Secondary sources: Allsen, *Mongol imperialism*, and idem, *Guard and government in the reign of the Grand Qan Möngke, 1251-59*, in *HJAS*, xlvi/2 (1986), 495-521. See also for the Muslim world, Barthold, *Turkestan*³, 1968, ch. 5.

(D.O. MORGAN)

MONGOLIA. Muslims in the modern Mongolian People's Republic.

The sole Muslim communities of the Republic live today within the Turkish-speaking Kazakh [see ḲAZAḲ] (Mo. *Hasag*) and Choton (Mo. *Hoton*) groups.

According to the 1960 census, 36,700 Kazakhs lived in the westernmost *aimak* or administrative division of the Republic, that is in existence since 1940 as the Bayan Ölgiy *aimak*; the *aimak* is also called Hasag *aimak*, "that of the Kazakhs". These Kazakhs of Mongolia are linguistically, culturally and historically closely linked with the Kazakhs of the Kazakh SSR or the Soviet Union, but at present only partially acknowledge themselves as Sunnī Muslims. The mosque (Mo. *lalyn süm*) of the Kazakh Muslims (Mo. *lalᶜ*, Tibetan *kla-klo* "barbarians, Muslims") in the administrative centre of the *aimak*, Ölgiy, is now no longer used for religious purposes. The Muslim ethnic group of the Chotons (no census figures are available) are settled to the south of the Uvsnuur lake in the Uvs *aimak* in existence since 1931 in the northwestern part of the Republic. The ancestors of the Chotons probably belonged to the section of the Muslim Turkish population of Eastern Turkestan (modern Sinkiang or Xinjiang in western China) who were in the 18th century deported by the West Mongolian Oirat-Dörbet and who settled in Mongolia. To what extent the Chotons are practising Muslims today is unknown.

Bibliography: *Narody mira. Etnograficheskie ocherki. Narody sredney Azii i Kazakhstana*, Moscow 1963; *Area handbook for Mongolia*, Washington D.C. 1970; J. Schubert, *Paralipomena Mongolica*, Berlin 1971.

(M. WEIERS)

Finally, it may be noted that there are Muslims of Mongolian stock and speaking languages of the Mongolian family—presumably the remnants of ethnic migrations or deportations of earlier times—in the province of Kansu [*q.v.*] or Gansu in the Chinese People's Republic. These comprise the small group of Bao'an (*ca.* 9,000) in north central Kansu, and the more numerous Dongxiang (*ca.* 300,000) in the autonomous country of that name in northwestern Kansu (see R. V. Weekes (ed.), *Muslim peoples, a world ethnographic survey*², London 1984, i, 167, 236).

(ED.)

MONGOLS, the name of a tribe whose original home was in the eastern part of the present-day Mongolian Peoples' Republic. In the 7th/13th and 8th/14th centuries, under Čingiz-Khān [*q.v.*] and his successors, they established by military conquest the most extensive continuous land empire known to history. At its greatest extent, it stretched from Korea to Hungary, including most of the mainland of Asia apart from India and the south-east of the continent. What is perhaps a form of the Mongol name has been found in Chinese sources of the T'ang Dynasty (A.D.

618-907), but they became prominent only in the 6th/12th century, when north China was ruled by the Chin Dynasty, of Tungus origin. The Mongols' definitive formation as a people appears to date from the time of the Liao Dynasty (A.D. 907-1125), who ruled in Eastern Mongolia and north China. The Liao emperors were Khitans, related ethnically and linguistically to the Mongols (on the Liao, see K.A. Wittfogel and C. Fêng, *History of Chinese society: Liao 907-1125*, Philadelphia 1949, and on the Mongols in this period, O. Lattimore, *The geography of Chingis Khan*, in *Geogr. Jnal.*, cxxix/1 [1963], 1-7). The sequence of political events in the history of the Mongol Empire is dealt with in other articles: see especially ČINGIZ-KHĀN; ČINGIZIDS; BATU; BATU'IDS; ČAGHATAY KHĀN; ČAGHATAY KHĀNATE; HŪLĀGŪ; ĪLKHĀNS; GHĀZĀN. This article is concerned with more general themes: the effects of the conquests, particularly in the Islamic world; institutions; and organisation.

1. *Effects of the Mongol conquests.*

The testimony of contemporary writers is unanimous when it describes the horrors that accompanied the Mongol invasion of the Khʷārazm-Shāh's empire in 616-20/1219-23. The most important of these historians are Ibn al-Athīr (in vol. xii), Nasawī (*Histoire du Sultan Djelal ed-Din Mankobirti*, ed. and tr. O. Houdas, 2 vols., Paris 1891-5) and Djūzdjānī (*Ṭabaḳāt-i Nāṣirī*, ed. ʿA.Ḥ. Ḥabībī, 2 vols., 2nd ed., Kabul 1342-3/1964-5; tr. H.G. Raverty, 2 vols., London 1881). These are supplemented by local histories such as Sayfī's *Taʾrīkh-nāma-yi Harāt* (ed. M.Z. al-Ṣiddīḳī, Calcutta 1944). Staggeringly high figures are quoted for the numbers of people alleged to have been massacred by the Mongols when they sacked the great cities of Khurāsān: Harāt—1,600,000 (Sayfī, 60) or 2,400,000 (Djūzdjānī, text, ii, 121); Nīshāpūr—1,747,000 (Sayfī, 63). Such examples are typical. They should not, however, be interpreted literally. Considerable uncertainty exists over the possible size of the populations of such cities in the mediaeval period, but it seems unlikely that Khurāsān could have possessed cities that were so much larger than the capital of the Sung Empire in South China, Hangchou, which contained perhaps a million inhabitants in the mid-7th/13th century (see J. Gernet, *Daily life in China on the eve of the Mongol invasion*, London 1962). It is probable that the normal population of the cities of Khurāsān was considerably swollen at the last minute by influxes of refugees from the countryside. But even if the chroniclers' fingers ought not to be approached as though they were statistics arrived at scientifically, they are certainly evidence of the state of mind created by the character of the Mongol invasion. The shock induced by the scale of the catastrophe had no precedent; this must imply that the death and destruction which produced that shock had no precedent either. Immediate shock will not suffice as a total explanation, however. Later writers such as Djuwaynī, Rashīd al-Dīn and Ḥamd Allāh Mustawfī Ḳazwīnī, recounting events of which they were not themselves contemporaries, do not attempt to minimise the extent of the disaster. Nor, despite the fact that they were all officials in the Mongol government of the Īlkhānate, do they suggest that their predecessors had exaggerated the degree of Mongol destructiveness.

The sources naturally concentrate their attention on the massacres in the cities. The effect of the Mongol invasions on agriculture, especially in Persia, is likely in the long run to have been more serious. Persian agriculture was, in the absence of great rivers on the plateau, heavily dependent on irrigation by means of *ḳanāts* [*q.v.*]. Some of these underground water channels were destroyed during the invasions, but more significant is the fact that a *ḳanāt* quickly ceases to operate if it is not constantly maintained. Hence if peasants were killed in large numbers, or fled from their land and stayed away, that land could well suffer substantial damage simply through neglect of the *ḳanāts*. If the agricultural hinterland of the cities was markedly reduced in extent as a result of destruction, neglect or a permanent reduction in the labour force, it might prove difficult to support those cities adequately and therefore to rebuild them to anything approaching their size. The question of the impact of the later invasion by Hülegü on the agriculture of ʿIrāḳ is a rather different one, since ʿIrāḳī irrigation was river-based. The part played by the Mongols in the decline of the fertility of the land between the Tigris and the Euphrates has been much discussed (see e.g. R.M. Adams, *Land behind Baghdad*, Chicago and London 1965, and the reservations on Adams's methodology expressed by A.M. Watson, *A medieval green revolution: new crops and farming techniques in the early Islamic world*, in A.L. Udovitch (ed.), *The Islamic Middle East, 700-1900: studies in economic and social history*, Princeton 1981, 53, n. 29). But whatever may be laid at the door of the Mongols' predecessors and successors as rulers of ʿIrāḳ, the Īlkhāns may well have contributed much to decay by allowing the irrigation canals to be neglected. In terms of actual loss of life, there seems no reason to doubt that Hülegü's invasion of the Islamic lands was a much less severe blow that Čingiz-Khān's had been. Again it is impossible to arrive at reliable figures. Ḥamd Allāh Mustawfī's estimate of the death toll (800,000) at the sack of Baghdād in 656/1258 is often quoted (*Taʾrīkh-i guzīda*, ed. ʿA. Nawāʾī, Tehran 1336-9/1958-61, 589); but this seems improbably high, and is perhaps refuted by Hülegü's own estimate, in a letter of 660/1262 to King Louis IX of France, of more than 200,000 (P. Meyvaert, *An unknown letter of Hulagu, Il-Khan of Persia, to King Louis IX of France*, in *Viator*, xi [1980], 256).

It seems likely, then, that the traditional view of the appalling immediate effects of the Mongol invasions should be accepted, at least as far as Transoxania and Khurāsān are concerned (for the contrary view, using 20th century parallels to suggest that the destructive impact of the Mongols has been much exaggerated, see B. Lewis, *The Mongols, the Turks and the Muslim polity*, in his *Islam in history*, London 1973, 179-98 and 324-5). The devastation was not, however, universal. South Persia, possibly unattractive to the Mongols because of its climate and, in terms of Mongol demand, the limited areas of pasture to be found there, escaped virtually unscathed. Similarly, it is now thought that the destruction resulting from the Mongol invasion of Russia in 635-9/1237-41, though serious, was patchy in its distribution, some areas sustaining little if any damage (see J.L.I. Fennell, *The crisis of medieval Russia 1200-1304*, London 1983, 86-9). It is clear that the havoc wrought by the Mongol campaigns in the lands of the Chin Empire of north China was not matched when, under the Great Khāns Möngke and Ḳubilay, they conquered the Sung Empire to the south. There they were concerned to acquire new territory as far as possible undamaged. Nevertheless, the following population figures for China, if they are accurate, remain to be explained: over 100 million in Sung and Chin times, declining to 70 million in the 1290s and 60 million a century later (J.D. Langlois, Jr. (ed.), *China under Mongol rule*, Princeton 1981, 20).

The more long-term effects of the period of Mongol

rule in the Islamic world are likely to have been, for the most part, deleterious. The 40 years of pagan Īlkhānid government before the accession of Ghazan in 694/1295 seem to have been characterised by ruthless and short-sighted exploitation, if the testimony of Rashīd al-Dīn, the principal authority, is to be accepted. There are perhaps some grounds for reserving judgment on this point, since Rashīd al-Dīn was chief minister to the reforming Ghazan, and hence may have had an interest in overstating the disorders of the preceding decades. Other contemporary writers such as Waṣṣāf do, however, confirm Rashīd al-Dīn, at least in general terms. The administration appears to have lurched from one financial crisis to another, with some taxes being levied 20 or 30 times each year. According to Rashīd al-Dīn, the results of such maladministration were a general flight from the land on the part of the peasantry and the reduction of nine-tenths of the cultivable land to waste (*Djāmiʿ al-tawārīkh*, iii, ed. A.A. Alizade, Baku 1957, 457, 558). A low point was reached during the reign of Gaykhatu (690-4/1291-5) with the attempt by his minister Ṣadr al-Dīn to solve the Īlkhānate's economic problems by the introduction of paper money, *čāw*, on the Chinese model. The expedient was a disastrous failure (see K. Jahn, *Paper currency in Iran*, in *Jnal. of Asian History* iv/2 [1970], 101-35).

Ghazan on his accession declared his conversion to Islam, and the Mongols of Persia duly followed his example, at least in name. The shock which the Islamic world had suffered, in that the Mongol conquests had brought infidel rule over a large part of the *Dār al-Islām*, was thus alleviated. (Indeed, one ultimate result of the conquest, following the conversion of other Mongol rulers to Islam, was an extension of the boundaries of the *Dār al-Islām*, notably in the lands of the Golden Horde and in Central Asia.) Ghazan's conversion, coupled with the celebrated programme of administrative reforms which he promptly initiated, no doubt marked a considerable improvement in Persia's fortunes. The reforms dealt with such matters as the rates and methods of payment of taxes; the reorganisation of the *Yam*, the postal courier system; the reformation of the coinage and of weights and measures; the activities and payment of *ḳāḍīs*; the offer of incentives to encourage the recultivation of land that had fallen out of use; and the employment of a form of the *iḳṭāʿ* to provide a means of paying the army (on Ghazan's reforms see A.K.S. Lambton, *Landlord and peasant in Persia*, London 1953, ch. 4; Spuler, *Mongolen*[4], Leiden 1985, I.P. Petrushevsky, in *Camb. hist. of Iran*, v, ed. J.A. Boyle, Cambridge 1968, 494-500; and idem, *Zemledelie i agrarnie otnosheniya v Irane XIII-XIVvv.*, Moscow-Leningrad 1960, 55-62). The texts of many of the reforming edicts (*yarlighs*) are preserved by Rashīd al-Dīn. They are certainly convincing evidence that Ghazan was aware of which abuses required the attention of the government. What cannot be stated with any degree of certainly is the extent to which, and for how long, the reforms were actually implemented. It is probable that the reforms had at least some beneficial effect, and that that effect, albeit decreasingly, continued to be felt after Ghazan's early death. But throughout the Īlkhānid period, increasingly substantial quantities of property were made into *awḳāf*, which may suggest both that there was a lack of real security of tenure (despite Ghazan's efforts) and that people had little confidence in the justness of Mongol government even after it had become Muslim.

2. *The Mongol army.*

The central and most essential institution of the Mongol Empire was its army. The nature of steppe nomadic society was such that normal life doubled as a process of military training: e.g. Mongol hunting practices were reflected in military tactics (see Djuwaynī, i, 21). All adult male Mongols below the age of 60 were liable for military service; there were in principle no Mongol civilians. The Mongols were thus able to mobilise a force, composed exclusively of cavalry, which was highly trained and could consist of an extremely high proportion of the available Mongol manpower. This is part of the explanation for the very large numbers given by contemporary sources for the size of Mongol armies. Nevertheless, there are other relevant factors. The extreme manœuvrability of the Mongol forces may have caused observers to exaggerate the numbers involved, as may such expedients as the mounting of dummies on spare horses (each Mongol soldier went on campaign with a string of five or more horses). The *Secret history of the Mongols* estimates that in 1206 Čingiz-Khān had an army of around 105,000 men; and according to Rashīd al-Dīn (drawing on a now lost Mongolian source, the *Altan debter*), the army in Mongolia proper at the death of Čingiz included some 129,000 men (see D.O. Morgan, *The Mongol armies in Persia*, in *Isl.*, lvi/1 [1979], 83). These figures may bear some relation to reality, which is unlikely to be true of such estimates as those of Djūzdjānī, who claims that the army that invaded the Khʷārazm-Shāh's empire was 700,000 or 800,000 strong (ed. Habībī, i, 311, ii, 104). On the other hand, the Mamlūk writer al-ʿUmarī's statement that in the 8th/14th century there were 2-300,000 men on the *dīwān* registers of the Īlkhānate is not implausible if this is taken to mean that there were in the kingdom that number of Mongol and Turkish adult males who could be called on to act as troops (K. Lech (ed. and tr.), *Das mongolische Weltreich*, Wiesbaden 1968, text, 79, tr., 145). The main objection to acceptance of very high estimates for the size of the Mongol army, aside from the difficulties of organising such huge forces in pre-modern conditions, lies in the question of how their animals could have been fed while on campaign; an army of 800,000 might have marched with 4 million or more horses, to say nothing of sheep and goats. Hülegü alleged that lack of adequate fodder and grazing forced his withdrawal from Syria in 658/1260 (Meyvaert, *op. cit.*, 258), and similar problems may help to explain the failure of the Īlkhāns in subsequent decades to incorporate Syria into the Mongol Empire (see Morgan, *The Mongols in Syria, 1260-1300*, in P.W. Edbury (ed.), *Crusade and settlement*, Cardiff 1985, 231-5). The Mongols, then, were effective militarily because of their competence rather than as a result of the sheer weight of numbers (for this view, see Morgan, *Mongol armies*). For the argument that the chroniclers' high figures should be taken seriously, and that the Mongol conquests were won by huge numbers rather than by military efficiency, see J.M. Smith Jr., *Mongol manpower and Persian population*, in *JESHO* xviii/3 [1975], 271-99; idem, *ʿAyn Jālūt: Mamlūk success or Mongol failure?*, in *HJAS*, xliv/2 [1984], 307-45).

Organisationally, the Mongol soldiers were grouped in multiples of 10, rising to the *tümen* (*tümān*) of 10,000—a system that had long been conventional in Asian steppe armies. It is not probable that *tümens* usually had as many soldiers as the theoretical number would suggest (see e.g. C. Hsiao, *The military establishment of the Yuan dynasty*, Cambridge, Mass.

1978, 170-1, n. 27). Čingiz-Khān appears to have utilised the military decimal system to bring about a radical reorganisation of the Turco-Mongolian tribal structure; defeated tribes were broken up and their surviving manpower distributed among other units. Hence something like an artificial new tribal structure was created, thus manufacturing new foci of loyalty and possibly helping to avert any attempt on the part of another tribe to overthrow the supremacy of the Čingizids. The élite force was the imperial guard, 10,000 strong in 1206, which was recruited across tribal boundaries and, forming as it did Čingiz's household, provided the personnel through whom the empire was administered in its early stages.

The Mongol cavalryman relied chiefly on the standard horn and sinew compound bow of the steppes, which had impressive range and power of penetration. Conquest of the cities of the sedentary empires required also the enlistment of siege engineers from both China and the Islamic lands. Auxiliary troops of non-Mongol origin were used, especially in China. After the conquest of China, they provided infantry and garrison troops. In Persia, native soldiers were made use of for such duties as the provision of garrisons and the guarding of passes: Ghazan is said to have organised them decimally (Rashīd al-Dīn, iii, ed. Alizade, 518).

Forces known as *tamma* or *tanma* were contingents selected from the total available Mongol power. Their purpose was to maintain and extend Mongol rule, and they were initially stationed on the steppe-sedentary borders. Some *tamma* units later formed the bases of the permanent armies of the subsidiary khānates into which the Mongol Empire was divided (P.D. Buell, *Kalmyk Tanggaci people: thoughts on the mechanics and impact of Mongol expansion*, in *Mongolian Studies*, vi [1980], 41-59). The puzzling Ḳarawnas or Negüderis (Nīkūdarīs) of the Indian borderlands have been shown to have originated in a *tamma* formation (J. Aubin, *L'ethnogénèse des Qaraunas*, in *Turcica* i [1969], 65-94).

3. *Law.*

One of the indispensable institutional foundations of the Mongol Empire is generally said to have been the "Great *Yasa* of Čingiz-Khān", allegedly a comprehensive legal code laid down, in all probability, in 1206, though perhaps supplemented later. The custody of this code was entrusted by Čingiz-Khān to his adopted brother Shigi-kutuḳu. The code has not survived, but it may be reconstructed, it has been believed, from fragments that are quoted in a variety of sources (see especially V.A. Riasanovsky, *Fundamental principles of Mongol law*, The Hague 1965). Many difficulties are, however, involved in holding this view. The main primary source, the *Secret history of the Mongols*, appears in the relevant passage to be concerned with the keeping of a record of *ad hoc* judicial decisions and with the beginnings of a kind of case law rather than with the creation of a legal code; and it does not use the term *yasa* (*ǰasaq: Secret history*, §203, tr. F.W. Cleaves, Cambridge, Mass., 1982, 143-4. Elsewhere in the *Secret history*, *ǰasaq* means an individual order or decree). So far as the supposed fragments are concerned, it has been shown that all those of significance derive ultimately from one source, Djuwaynī (see D. Ayalon, *The Great* Yāsa *of Chingiz Khān: a reexamination. A*, in *SI*, xxxiii [1971], 97-140). Examination of Djuwaynī's material (i, especially 17-18) shows that he was recording the writing down for consultation of Čingiz-Khān's precepts on such matters as military training, communications and taxation; there is no reference to a general legal code.

The belief—certainly to be found reflected in later sources—in the existence of the Great *Yasa* is probably to be explained as having been founded on a knowledge of the unwritten Mongol customary law, the evolution of which began long before the time of Čingiz-Khān and continued after his death. In addition, there may well have been some recollection of Čingiz's maxims (*billig*, *bilīk*), which were preserved and respected; Rashīd al-Dīn records them at length, though he has nothing at all to offer on the contents of the "Great *Yasa*". One further possibility is that written records of certain legal cases (*yarghu-nāma*), which we know to have been made and preserved for future reference (see Muḥammad b. Hindūshāh Nakhdjawānī, *Dastūr al-kātib*, ii, ed. A.A. Alizade, Moscow 1976, 29-35) may have given rise to the notion that Mongol law was written down, despite the absence of convincing contemporary evidence that anything of the kind was in fact done. Mongol customary law was no doubt enforced, and in the Islamic world continued in uneasy co-existence with the *sharīʿa*, but precisely how this worked is difficult to recover from our sources (for the above view, see Morgan, The *"Great* Yāsā *of Chingiz Khān" and Mongol law in the Īlkhānate*, in *BSOAS*, xlix/1 [1986], 163-76; the more usual opinion is well represented by P. Ratchnevsky, *Die Yasa (J̌asaq) Činggis-khans und ihre Problematik*, in *Schriften zur Geschichte und Kultur des alten Orients. v. Sprache, Geschichte und Kultur der altaischen Völker*, Berlin 1974, 471-87; idem, *Činggis-Khan, sein Leben und Wirken*, Wiesbaden 1983, 164-72).

4. *Taxation.*

This may be dealt with briefly, see KHARĀDJ. II. In Persia, and ḲŪBČŪR. Many terms are used in the sources for taxation, but the principal taxes of Mongol origin seem to have been three in number. *Ḳūbčūr* [*q.v.*] was at first a 1% levy on the nomads' flocks and herds, but later the term is used to denote a poll-tax payable by the conquered sedentary population. It is possible that the Mongols may have derived this latter usage from the Uyghur Turks, who exercised a pervasive influence on the administration of the early Mongol Empire (see T.A. Allsen, *The Yüan Dynasty and the Uigurs of Turfan in the 13th century*, in M. Rossabi (ed.), *China among equals: the middle kingdom and its neighbors 10th-14th centuries*, Berkeley 1983, 263, 278 n. 141). The precise meaning of *ḳalan*, the other Mongol tax most commonly mentioned (and abused) in the Persian sources, remains unclear (for an attempt at definition, seeking to show that *ḳalan* was a general term used to cover pre-Mongol, Islamic taxation, see J.M. Smith Jr., *Mongol and nomadic taxation*, in *JHAS*, xxx [1970], 46-85). The most likely explanation would seem to be that it was in fact a general term for occasional exactions of a specifically Mongol rather than Islamic character, imposed on the sedentary population by the Mongols and including some kind of corvée. The third of the most important taxes was *tamgha*, a levy on commercial transactions whose prominence testifies to the importance in Mongol eyes of trade.

The purpose of such taxes was the maximum possible degree of exploitation of the conquered population. This exploitation was normally limited, if at all, only by the common-sense consideration that enough should be left to the peasants to permit their survival and thus a further year's payment of taxes. Mongol taxation was more a pragmatic series of exactions, as seemed appropriate and profitable, than a fixed

system, despite the willingness of some modern historians to discern the existence of such a system. The burden imposed by the specifically "Mongol" taxes was the greater in that the conquered people of the Islamic lands were also required to continue payment of the old pre-Mongol taxes. As in other fields, the burden may well have become for a time more supportable as a result of the reforms of Ghazan.

5. *Communications.*

The vast extent of the Mongol's empire made it necessary for them to establish an effective network of communications. Such a network, the *Yam*, was duly set up: according to the sources by the second Great Khān, Ögedey, rather than by Čingiz-Khān himself (*Secret history*, §279, tr. Cleaves, 225; Rashīd al-Dīn, ii/1, ed. Alizade, Moscow 1980, 121-2, 143-4). The *Yam* was designed to facilitate the travels of envoys going to and from the Mongol courts; for the transportation of goods (especially on the route between North China and Mongolia); for the speedy transmission of royal orders; and to provide a framework whereby the Mongol rulers could receive intelligence. It was also frequently, if illegitimately, used by officials and private individuals of influence, a practice that was forbidden so often as to suggest that such prohibitions were of limited and temporary effect.

Post stations were erected throughout the empire at stages equivalent to a day's journey: about every 25 or 30 miles, or more in desolate areas, according to Marco Polo (*Travels*, tr. A. Ricci, London 1931, 153). Responsibility for the maintenance of the facilities fell to the local army units; horses and supplies were contributed by the population of the area, the incidence of exactions being determined on the basis of the census returns which also regulated the imposition of poll-tax, *kübčür*. Urgent messages could travel very much faster than 25 miles a day: Marco Polo (tr. Ricci, 157) speaks of 2-300 miles, and Rashīd al-Dīn (iii, ed. Alizade, 484) of 60 *farsakh*s. The traveller's authorisation took the form of a wooden or metal tablet (*paiza*; Chinese *p'ai-tse*, Mongolian *gerege*). The efficiency of the system impressed European observers, and although Rashīd al-Dīn has much to say of the abuses to which it was subjected in the Ilkhānate, it seems on the whole to have worked well. The *barīd* of the Mamlūk state may have been influenced by its example (J. Sauvaget, *La poste aux chevaux dans l'empire des Mamelouks*, Paris 1941, 13), as was the later *ulak* system of the Ottoman Empire. The search for influences on the Mongols themselves leads to China; the courier system of the Liao Dynasty had too many similarities to the Mongol *Yam* for them to have been entirely coincidental (see e.g. I. de Rachewiltz, *Personnel and personalities in north China in the early Mongol period*, in *JESHO*, ix [1966], 111-2. On the *Yam* in China, see P. Olbricht, *Das Postwesen in China unter der Mongolenherrschaft im 13 und 14 Jahrhundert*, Wiesbaden 1954. There is no detailed study for any other part of the empire).

6. *Administration.*

In general terms, the Mongols' approach towards the administration of their empire was a pragmatic one. They were prepared to learn from other peoples, especially those who had both a respectable steppe pedigree and experience in the techniques necessary for the government of an empire that included a large sedentary sector. The most marked influence in the empire's early decades was exercised by the Uyghurs and the Khitans. The Mongols speedily adopted both the Uyghur alphabet for the writing of Mongolian (previously an unwritten language) and elements of Uyghur chancery practice. The Khitans were probably even more influential. During the initial stages of the empire's administrative evolution, the most important all-purpose Mongol official was the *darughači*. Study of his role (see e.g. Buell, *Sino-Khitan administration in Mongol Bukhara*, in *Jnal. of Asian History* xiii/2 [1979]) has left little doubt about its Khitan origin. This is merely one example of such institutional borrowing (see further Morgan, *Who ran the Mongol Empire?*, in *JRAS* [1982], 124-36). The Khitans provided personnel as well as administrative machinery; the careers of a number of them who entered Mongol service have been traced (see de Rachewiltz, *op. cit.*; Buell, *Sino-Khitan administration*).

After they had conquered Persia and China, the Mongols became the rulers of great sedentary societies that possessed complex administrative traditions of long standing. In Persia, the Mongols permitted a considerable degree of administrative continuity with the past to be maintained. Prior to the setting up of the Īlkhānate, non-Persians frequently held the highest governmental offices, and even after the time of Hülegü, members of minority groups, such as the Jew Saʿd al-Dawla, were influential at times, their promotion causing resentment among the Muslim population. But throughout the period of the Īlkhānate, the administration of Persia seems to have rested largely in the hands of members of the established Muslim Persian bureaucracy. The most conspicuous example of this was the Djuwaynī family. When the *ṣāḥib-dīwān* Shams al-Dīn Djuwaynī was executed in 683/1284 (his brother the historian having died of natural causes in the previous year), members of the family had held high governmental offices virtually without a break for around 80 years, serving Khʷārazm-Shāhs and Mongols in turn. Our sources leave us with the impression that, by and large, the administrative machine continued to work in the traditional fashion, and that the Mongols were reasonably content to leave the task of administration to their Persian officials, so long as they showed themselves capable of securing the requisite revenue from taxation. It should however be remembered that this impression is based largely on the works of Djuwaynī, Rashīd al-Dīn, Waṣṣāf and Ḥamd Allāh Mustawfī Ḳazwīnī, all of whom were Persians and members of that same bureaucracy. The Mongols themselves left no written sources on the history of their rule in Persia.

The administration of China was not left in the hands of native officials to the same extent as was that of the Īlkhānate. Lower-ranking officials were retained in office, but there were no Chinese equivalents to Shams al-Dīn Djuwaynī or Rashīd al-Dīn. The Chinese were excluded from the highest positions, which were reserved for foreigners: Middle Eastern and Central Asian Muslims, Khitans, Uyghurs, Europeans. This policy may have been adopted (as Marco Polo, himself one of its beneficiaries, suggested) because the Great Khāns regarded foreigners as more trustworthy than the Chinese since they had no local loyalties (*Travels*, tr. Ricci, 127). The traditional civil service examinations, which tested candidates' knowledge of the Chinese classics, were not held until 715/1315; and they never, under the Mongols, recovered their former importance as a road to high office in the state.

Overall, it may be said that the Mongols were prepared to adopt almost any institutional arrangements and to employ any potential servant, as

long as this appeared likely to facilitate the maintenance of effective government. This effectiveness was measured chiefly by the revenue receipts. There is little that is identifiably "Mongol" in the governmental institutions of the Mongols' empire, except the way in which they made so extraordinary disparate an assemblage work. The principal constraint was always the consideration that nothing should be done that might endanger Mongol military supremacy, on which in the last analysis the perpetuation of Mongol rule depended.

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(D.O. MORGAN)

MONEY [see NAḲD; SIKKA].

MONK [see RĀHIB].

MONKEY [see ḲIRD].

MONOGAMY [see NIKĀḤ; ZAWĀDJ].

MONOPHYSITES [see NAṢĀRĀ].

MONOPOLY [see RÉGIE].

MONOTHEISM [see TAWḤĪD].

MONSOON [see MAWSIM].

MONTENEGRO [see ḲARA DAGH].

MONTH [see TAʾRĪKH].

MOORS, in Arabic *al-Mār*, a rather vague term, used until the 19th century in virtually all Western European languages, to indicate the ancient Muslims of Spain and the inhabitants of the Mediterranean ports of North Africa. The origin of the term is not yet clear. It derives either from Semitic *mahourím* "the people of the West", or from Berber (Rinn, in *RAfr.*, xxix, 244 ff.). The Greek word Μαύροίςτιος appears for the first time in